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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JENNIFER KAY WOOD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CITATION OF SUPPPLEMENTAL 
AUTHORITIES 
Case No. 981670-CA 
Priority No.2 
On August 23, 1999, oral arguments were held in the above-captioned matter before a 
Panel of Judges consisting of Judge Bench, Judge Billings and Judge Orme. In light of the 
questions posed by the Panel and pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, as amended, the following authorities are cited for consideration. 
1. Regarding the issue of the burden for a facial attack on the constitutionally of a 
statute/ordinance: 
Roulette v. City of Seattle. 78 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1996) 
State v. Mohl 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995) 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991) 
2. Regarding the issue of regulation of expressive conduct: 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) 
3. Regarding the effect of the 44 Liquormart case (cited in brief) on California v. LaRue 
and its progeny (cited in brief): 
Sammy's v. City of Mobile. No. 96-7073, decided May 8,1998 (11th Cir.) 
Dated this 3f day of A t ^ ^ X ~ , 1999. A 
>rb: 
Don M. Wrye 
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _J? /<#"~day of August, 1999,1 caused to be delivered 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Citation of Supplemental Authorities to the Appellant's 
attorney, W. Andrew McCuUough, 895 West Center Street, Orem, Utah 84057, by placing the 
same in the mail postage prepaid. 
cfb^ WS^/-
Don M. Wrye 
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C.* 
Attorney at Law 
895 West Center Street 
Or em, Utah 84057 
*A2so admitted in New York 
Telephone: 
Facsimile: 
(801) 222-9635 
(801) 222-9128 
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450 South State 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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RE: "City of Salt Lake v. Jennifer K. Wood" 
Appeal no. 981670-CA 
Ladies & Gentlemen: 
On August 23, 1999, oral arguments were held in this matter, 
and counsel was asked whether facial attacks for overbreadth 
under the First Amendment could be made on a city licensing 
ordinance. Counsel cited the case of FW/PBS Inc. v. Dallas, 493 
U.S. 215 (1990). It appears that appellant did not cite that 
case in her brief. The authority relied on for the right to 
challenge such a licensing ordinance is overbroad under the First 
Amendment is found at 493 U.S. at 223-225. 
This letter is a citation of supplemental authorities 
pursuant to Rule 24 (i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
WAM:lc 
cc: Don M. Wrye, Esq. 
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OF COUNSEL 
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css@clydesnow.com 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
RE: Peterson v. Peterson 
Appellate No. 981652-CA 
Second District Court No. 824983079 DA 
Priority No. 15 
Clerk of the Court: 
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(i) the attorneys for Appellee 
hereby submit the supplemental authority of Williamson v. Williamson. 372 Utah Adv. Rep 45, 
Appellate No. 981245-CA, decided July 1, 1999, a copy of which is hereafter attached. The 
supplemental authority is relevant to this appeal in that it sets forth the proper standard for ruling 
on a petition to terminate alimony. The supplemental authority is specifically relevant to 
Argument 1 of the Brief of Appellee, page 5 and 6. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Clyde Sno^g^sions & Swenso 
Clark W. Sessions 
Matthew A. Steward 
MAS/knh 
enclosure 
cc: Michael Mohrman 
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reasonable inferences from that evidence." State v. 
Coyer, 814 P.2d 604,612 (Utah Ct App. 1991). 
1 16 "A person commits theft if, having control 
over the disposition of services of another, to which 
he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to 
his own benefit... .* Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409(2) 
(1995). Based on the evidence, the jury could have 
concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was 
enough evidence to satisfy the requisite elements of 
theft of services. Defendant had entered into a 
private contract for which he was compensated over 
and above his salary as Administrator. The county 
commissioners told him to complete the work cm his 
ovm time. Tfe county resources used by defendant 
were arguably for portions of the waste management 
plan he had privately contracted to perform. Because 
the jury is "entitled to judge the testimony in the 
light of their experience in the every-day affairs of 
life,1" Bryant, 965 R2d at 545 (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Holland v. Brawn, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 
P.2d 77, 79 (1964)), they were not imprudent in 
concluding that defendant knew he should not have 
been using county resources for items that were 
defendant's personal duty to complete under the 
private contract. 
CONCLUSION 
^ 17 The jury instruction on the failure to disclose 
charge did not properly instruct the jury regarding the 
mens rea. Even if it had, however, there was 
insufficient competent evidence to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and 
intentionally Med to file the required disclosure 
form. Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction 
for failure to disclose transaction to government 
employer charge. 
118 We do not disturb the jury's verdict finding 
defendant guilty of theft of services. There was 
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that defendant 
had diverted county resources for his own benefit 
that he knew he was not entitled to and over which 
he had control. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
I t * WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding Judge 
Norman H Jackson, Judge 
Cite as 
372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Joan WILLIAMSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Stuart Kim WILLIAMSON, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 981245-CA 
FILED: July l t 1999 
First District, Logan Department 
The Honorable Clint S. Judkins 
ATTORNEYS: 
Larry E. Jones and Lyle W. Hillyard, Logan, for 
Appellant 
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogdea, for Appellee 
Before Judges Wilkins, Jackson, and Orme. _ 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter 
1. Bath testimonial and documentary evidence show that 
defendant's proposed involvement in the project was 
appropriately disclosed to and approved by the county 
commission. Accordingly, we will refer herein only to the 
failure to file a sworn statement portion of the charge. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
11 Joan Williamson appeals the trial court's 
termination of alimony and its denial of her request 
for attorney fees. We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
12 Joan and Stuart Kim Williamson divorced on 
May 24, 1996, following a twenty-three-year 
marriage. When they divorced, they had one minor 
child, whose custody was awarded to Ms. 
Williamson. The parties stipulated that Mr. 
Williamson would pay $368 per month as child 
support and $425 per month as alimony. The 
stipulated decree provided that alimony would end 
when Ms. Williamson married, cohabited, or died. 
13 When they divorced, Mr. Williamson was 
earning roughly $3,550 per month as a supervisor at 
Morton Automotive Safety Products, hi late August 
1996, Mr. Williamson was fired for unsatisfactory 
performance and violating company policy. About 
| one month later, Mr. Williamson filed a Petition to 
i Modify the child support provisions of the divorce 
f decree. Shortly thereafter, he filed an Amended 
Petition to Modify, asking that alimony also be 
modified. He asserted that the decrease in his income 
was a substantial change of circumstances justifying 
a reduction of both obligations. 
^4 Mr. Williamson later started working for his 
brother's drywali business as a drywall taper, making 
$11 per hour. After a hearing on Mr. Williamson's 
petition to modify, the trial court found that his 
income was $2,090 per month. Mr. Williamson's 
brother testified that he was paid less than other 
workers because his age and physical problems 
caused him to work slowly. Ms. Williamson 
presented testimony that a drywaller of similar age 
and physical health could make $ 13 to $ 15 per hour 
15 Ms. Williamson's income at the time of the 
divorce was $1,442 per month. By the time of the 
46 Williamson v. Williamson 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 
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modification hearing, her pay had increased, and she 
also earned some overtime pay and had taken a 
part-time job. The trial court found her income to be 
$1,692 per month. 
^6 At the close of the hearing, the trial court found 
that there had been a substantial change of 
circumstances since the parties divorced. The court 
then reduced child support to S271.64 per month and 
ended alimony. The court ordered Mr. and Ms. 
Williamson to bear their own attorney fees. 
f7 On appeal, Ms. Williamson challenges the 
sufficiency of the trial court's findings regarding 
alimony. She also contends the trial court abused its 
discretion in ending her alimony entirely. Finally, she 
argues she should be awarded attorney fees both 
below and on appeal.1 
ANALYSIS 
L Terminating Alimony 
J8 Ms. Williamson first argues the trial court's 
findings of fact are insufficient to support aiding 
alimony.2 We agree. Before the trial court can modify 
a divorce decree, it must find that there has been a 
"substantial material change of circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce."3 Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(7XgXi) (1998). Once that finding has 
been made, the court must then consider "at least the 
following factors in determining alimony: (i) the 
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse 
to provide support; and (iv) the length of the 
marriage." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (1998).4 
These factors apply not only to an initial award of 
alimony, but also to a redetermination of alimony 
during a modification proceeding. See Christiansen 
v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592,595 (Utah 1983). The 
trial court must then make findings of fact based on 
these factors. See Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 
877, 880 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
^9 The standard for findings in modification 
proceedings is well established. w,(T]he trial court 
must make findings on all material issues, and its 
failure to delineate what circumstances have changed 
and why these changes support the modification 
made in the prior divorce decree constitutes 
reversible error unless the facts in the record are 
clear, uncontroverted and only support the 
judgment.m Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 
Ct App. 1992) (quoting Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 
790 P.2d 57,61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The findings 
should be more than cursory statements; they must 
"be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.'" Id. (quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). 
110 In this case, the trial court stated that it was 
"painting with a broad brush," and made findings 
only on the parties' incomes at the time of the divorce 
and at the time of the modification hearing. The trial 
court, however, should have substituted a sharpened 
pencil for its broad brush and set forth detailed 
findings on the factors specified in section 30-3-
5(7Xa). "Accordingly, we remand for the trial court 
to enter adequate findings, supported by sufficient 
evidence," on the factors set forth in section 
30-3-5(7Xa). Muir, 841 P.2d at 741. That is, the trial 
court should consider evidence of, and enter findings 
regarding, all four statutory factors: i.e., Ms. 
Williamson's "financial conditions and needs" and 
her "earning capacity or ability to produce income," 
Mr. Williamson's ability to provide support, and the 
length of the parties' marriage.5 Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5(7Xa)(1998). 
111 When considering Ms. Williamson's financial 
condition and earning capacity, and Mr. Williamson's 
ability to give support, the trial court should move 
beyond merely considering their incomes and inquire 
more fully into their financial situations, including 
Mr. Williamson's new spouse's "financial ability to 
share living expenses" with him. Id. 
§30-3-5(7XgXiiiXA). This in-depth consideration of 
the parties' circumstances is necessary to fulfill the 
goal of alimony, which is to equalize the parties' 
standards of living, not just their incomes, in those 
cases in which insufficient resources exist to satisfy 
both parties' legitimate needs. See Olson v. Olson, 
704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985£ Fullmer v. 
Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
Moreover, the trial court should consider current 
evidence of the parties' financial situations, as their 
"circumstances . . . may have changed during this 
appeal."Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431,438 (Utah Ct 
App. 1999). 
T[12 Although our decision is based on the 
insufficiency of the findings below, we remind the 
trial court that "the power to terminate [alimony} 
should be exercised with caution and only after full 
consideration of the circumstances of the parties.. 
. ." 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 813 
(1998) (emphasis added). We note, for the trial 
court's guidance on remand, that 
for the trial court to terminate [an] alimony 
award, there must be an articulated basis for 
doing so; i.e., the court must be persuaded 
that [the recipient spouse] will be able to 
support [him- or] herself at a standard of 
living to which [he or] she was accustomed 
during the parties' marriage, or that [the 
payor spouse] is no longer able to pay. 
Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 951. In determining this, the 
trial court should consider Mr. Williamson's reduced 
income, but that factor alone is not enough to justify 
ending alimony. See Jense v. Sense, 784 P.2d 1249, 
1252 (Utah Ct App. 1989) ("The loss of a job . . . 
may go to [a payor spouse's] ability to pay the 
judgment, but it is not a proper basis upon which to 
change the amount of the original award."). We note 
further that the child support paid by Mr. Williamson 
to Ms. Williamson is earmarked for the parties' 
minor child and should not be considered as income 
to Ms. Williamson for purposes of calculating 
alimony. SeeReickv. Reick, 652 P.2d 916,917(Utah 
1982) (stating "the basic and unalienable right to 
child support... is vested in the minor"). 
DL Attorney Fees 
H13 Ms. Williamson argues the trial court should 
have awarded her attorney fees below. Section 
30-3-3( 1) states that a trial court may award attorney 
fees in a modification proceeding. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (1998). Here, each party proffered 
$ 1,500 in attorney fees, and neither party objected to 
the other's proffer or the reasonableness of the fees. 
The trial court ordered both parties to pay their own 
Code-Co 
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attorney fees, but made no findings about either 
-party's need for or ability to pay attorney fees. "In 
short, the court gave no explanation for requiring 
each party tobear his or her own fees and costs. The 
absence of these findings prevents a meaningful 
reviewoffetrfelcourts ruling." Wilde v. Wilde>969 
P.2d438,444(tftahCt App. 1998). AcconEn^we 
remand for the trial court to reconsider Ms. 
Williamson's request for attorney fees and to enter 
findings regarding the same.6 
f t 4 Ms. Williamson also requests attorney fees 
on appeal. She is the successful party on appeal and, 
accordingly, should she be awarded attorney fees on 
remand, we instruct the trial court also to hear 
evidence regarding her reasonable attorney fees cm 
appeal and to order Mr. Williamson to pay those 
fees. See id. If the trial court does not award her 
attorney fees below, she will bear her own attorney 
fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
^15 We remand to rJie trial court to cx>nsider, and 
enter findings regarding, the alimony factors set out 
in section 30-3-5{7Xa). Should the result differ cm 
remand, we direct tie trial court to enter appropriate 
conclusions and an order regarding alimony. We also 
remand for entry of findings, conclusions, and an 
order regarding attorney fees below. If Ms. 
Williamson is awarded fees below, we order that she 
also be awarded her fees on appeal. 
Norman R Jackson, Judge 
t ! 6 WE CONCUR: 
Michael J Wilkins, Presiding Judge 
Gregory K Qrme, Judge 
1.'We decline to address Ms. Williamson's other arguments 
because they are without merit or not necessary to our 
disposition^thucase. SeeStdtev. Carter, 776 P.2d 886,888 
(Utah, 1989) (stating we "need not analyze and address in 
writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and 
properly before us on appeal"). 
2. We agree with Ms. WiJIiamson that she "need not engage in 
a futile marshalling exercise [because she} can demonstrate the 
findings, as framed by the court, are legally insufficient" 
Campbell VL Campbell* 896 P.2d635, 638 (Utah Ct App. 
1995). 
3. Ms. Williamson does act challenge the detennination that 
there was a substantial material change of circumstances. As 
the trial courts d^etermination that there fhas or has not] been 
a substantial change of circumstances.. .is presumed valid," 
and she has not challenged that determination, we will not 
disturb the trial court's ruling on this issue. WeUs v. Wells, 871 
P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct App. 1994) (alterations in 
original). 
4. Section 30-3-5(7)(a) codifies the three factors set out in 
English v. Enghsh, 565 P.2d 409,411-12 (Utah 1977), and 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Iftah 1985X often j 
referred to as the "Jones factors." The statute adds a fourth 
factor-the length of the parties' marriage. 
5. That the parties were married for twenty-three years was an 
undisputed fact before the trial court However, because the 
findings are cursory, we do not know whether the trial court 
considered the long length of the marriage in deciding to end 
alimony. 
6. Insofar as the court's decision to have Ms. Williamson pay 
her own fees is attnbutable to Mr. Williamson's having 
prevailed on his petition-something the trial court did not 
articulate but might have had in muid-the rationale may need 
to be reassessed, depending on the outcome of the proceedings 
on remand. 
» [ Cite as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
' OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I Cyndi W. GILBERT, 
; I Plaintiff and Appellant, 
[ I Paul R. INCE and Callister, Nebeker & 
• I McCuJIough (fka Callister, Duncan & Nebeker), 
[ a Utah professional corporation, 
I Defendants and Appellees. 
I No. 9793*2 
I FILED: July 2,1999 
1999 UT 65 
J Fifth District, St George Dept 
I The Honorable J. Philip Eves 
I ATTORNEYS: 
I Scott M Lilja, Jonathan Hawkins, Salt Lake 
I City, for plaintiff 
I Stephen G. Morgan, Cynthia K. C. Meyer, 
1 Jeffrey C. Miner, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
I This opinion is subject to revision before final 
I publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
I RUSSON, Justice; 
I Tfl Plaintiff Cyndt W. Gilbert appeals from a verdict 
[ in favor of defendants Paul R. Ince and the law firm 
I of Callister, Nebeker &McCuUough. Gilbert brought 
I suit against defendants, allegingthey had wrongfully 
I used civil proceedings in filing and maintaining a 
I malpractice action against her. The trial court 
I conducted a jury trial and, at the conclusion of 
I Gilbert's case in chief, granted defendants motion for 
I a directed verdict We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
I f2 Cyndi Gilbert is an attorney* as was Paul R. Ince 
I at the time the relevant events in this case occurred. 
I Ince was a shareholder of the firm Callister, Nebeker 
[ &Mc^unough(fonnerIy known as Callister, Ehmcan 
& Nebeker). The events giving rise to this case 
primarily concern the financial affairs of 
Dr. Charles E. Gunnoe. Gilbert and Ince acted as 
Gunnoe's attorney on separate occasions, representing 
his interests as a claimant in different bankruptcy 
proceedings. Gilbert began representing Gunnoe in 
; early 1986 with respect to Gunnoe's interest in real 
property held by an entity known as Mountain View 
Holdings Ltd. Ince began representing Gunnoe in 
mid-1990 with respect to Gunnoe's interests in assets 
held by Brian Head Enterprises, Inc. 
^3 A complicated series of events linked the two 
bankruptcy proceedings, which resulted in Gunnoe's 
filing suit against Gilbert for malpractice in 
September of 1990. The malpractice 
complaint—prepared and signed by Ince in his 
capacity as Gunnoe's attorney-consisted of two 
essential claims: breach of contract and conflict of 
interest. In substance, the complaint alleged that 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY CLOCK and ANNE CLOCK, 
Plaintiff-Appellees, 
vs. 
JOHN F. GREEN and LARUE GREEN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
Docket No. 981612 
The Appellees, Wesley Clock and Anne Clock, move the Court for Summary Disposition 
pursuant to Rule 10, U.R. App.P., to dismiss the instant appeal, and for sanctions and an award 
of attorneys fees against Appellants and their counsel pursuant to Rule 33(a), U.R. App.P, This 
Motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum and the Affidavit of Wesley Clock filed 
therewith. 
DATED this day of December, 1998. 
Bryan W. Cannon, Attorney for Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary 
Disposition and Motion for Attorneys Fees, postage prepaid, first class mail, to: 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney for Appellants 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
this/2? day of December, 1998. 
